The Congress' Complete Surrender

What was supposed to be the Manmohan Singh’s day in the sun has turned out to become the albatross that will mar his CV in the years to come. The Indo-US nuclear deal was championed by Singh as a policy initiative that would have addressed India’ energy needs while at the same time give it parity and due recognition in the emerging world order. Having backed the deal to the hilt the prime minister faced down the entire opposition and the Left in a sincere show of his ‘progressive’ credentials. Ultimately, the turn of events has not only left the UPA in disarray, with the allies becoming more powerful than the principal Congress party, it has dented irreversibly the standing of Singh on the Indian political sphere. The rhetoric that caught the nation’s fancy turned out to be little else but rhetoric. The nation thought that here we have a sincere man ready to forsake power and the prime ministerial position for the larger national interest. However, forcibly or consciously, the prime minister has left a nation amazed and disappointed and a government that is looking like a lame duck regime.

The virtual U-turn by the prime minister has been projected as pragmatic politics by many sympathetic analysts. They argue that Singh gave up on the deal in order to salvage the government and thereby ensured that India did not get rattled by a mid-term election. It is the same analysts who till recently lauded the prime minister for being a technocrat rather than a seasoned politician, which they argued added to his appeal and marked a break from the wheeling-dealings of power politics that we have become accustomed to. While the argument holds certain merits, there is certainly no arguing the fact that by backing off from the deal, Manmohan Singh has proven himself to be just another politician. One who does not want to shake the boat unnecessarily as long as the continuity of his regime is ensured. That the deal has its demerits is well documented and appreciated, however, if these demerits were so important that it meant a public reversal from backing the deal, then why did the prime minister back the deal for the past year? If he was genuinely interested in the concerns of the Left should he have not taken a more conciliatory approach to the matter in public? If deals of supposed national interests can be sacrificed at the altar of coalition dharma, was it not prudent on the government to make the nation aware of it prior to having signed on the dotted line? And lastly, if indeed the decisions of this government are taken at 10 Janpath and not by 7 Race Course Road, does the prime minister not worry about what sort of sycophantic legacy he is leaving behind?

The UPA wanted to prolong the life of the Manmohan regime to ensure that some of its policy initiatives for the aam admi show impact before calling for elections. This is why a slew of initiatives have been launched for the rural sector which includes life and health insurance for the unorganized sector along with packages for drought affected farmers. The UPA allies fear that the public may not take to the ineffectual three and half years of the UPA too kindly. Scams like Bofors and the great Quattarochi escape, Volcker and the wheat import fiasco coupled with the charge of minority appeasement and being soft on terror will not show well on the three year report card. While the markets maybe booming, inflation and price rise have hit the public psyche negatively. Ram Sethu, Sonia Gandhi’s power behind the throne charge amongst issues like tainted ministers will definitely bolster the opposition’s UPA chargesheet. The UPA knows this and they had no option but to sacrifice a deal that seemed to be opposed by the majority of parliamentarians in order to devote the time till 2009 for showing some results on the ground. The Congress has already given the credit for the National Rural Guarantee Scheme and its further expansion to the Gandhi clan, further they have made the Right to Information sound like the brainwork of Sonia Gandhi, that left only the nuclear deal to the prime minister’s credit. Since there is no backing from the deal that bears the stamp of approval of 10 Janpath, the nuclear deal was the convenient scapegoat. The Congress realizes that by backing the deal and thereby the prime minister they are putting their hopes on a leader who will have no political standing post 2009. And in such a scenario losing a government on the basis of a compromise candidate prime minister seemed foolhardy. And hence, one saw the complete capitulation of the Congress on the nuclear deal. What Manmohan Singh was left with was brickbats and ridicule.

Can the good doctor redeem himself to the nation or is his political epitaph all but written. One feels that the prime minister knows that he has lost all moral authority over this government. Any initiative that he takes today may not enjoy the support of a skeptical nation, who might fear a repeat U-turn on any new initiatives that may come under criticism from its allies. What matters in the end is that the Congress has provided its version of coalition dharma – crawl when you are asked to bend.